Abstract
S tating the problem
H ow a community understands itself underpins its own cultural bias. In keeping with contemporary understanding o f culture as an open-ended resource (Thornton, 1988:17) , built up through history -a resource on which members o f a community draw to mediate the exigencies o f their everyday lives, a community's self-understanding is at any given time in its history the bedrock o f its cultural capital, providing at once
• an interpretive framework for the generation o f social meaning (especially as this relates to the generation o f a political identity),
• a m arker for the boundaries o f social identity and choice,
• a conception o f the social processes by which social and cultural goods are produced and distributed.
The integrated sum o f these things we call a community's self-understanding. A com m unity's self-understanding forms the bedrock o f its social and political identity. A com munity's social identity is its characteristic w ay o f life which mem bers have sustained over a considerable period o f time as an integrated cultural whole, and to which individual members stand in a dialogical relation i.e. one which supplies an interactive context in and through which they actualize their identities and exercise their choices.
A community's political identity is its characteristic forms o f institutional organization -characteristic in the sense that these forms o f organization reflect its cultural bias, and so provide distinctive avenues through which pow er is attained and exercised.
Ideally a community's political identity should grow out o f its social identity. A community can be said to enjoy a coherent and stable social life if its political life simply is institutionalized culture. This view o f a dependence relation between social and political identity poses some problems for culturally diverse and heterogeneous states like South Africa and, indeed, m ost o f the African states. The problem here is that diverse cultural communities which do not inhabit the same world o f shared social meanings and understandings co-exist within single political communities. Thus the following question arises: if political communities do not inhabit the same world o f shared understandings, how do w e conceive o f the relation between social and political identity? The response to -this problem by African thinkers and politicians in South Africa have been conditioned by their experiences under the existential and social conditions o f the apartheid era. During the apartheid era this response took the form o f a Marxist transplant onto a traditional communal (communitarian) form o f social life. It is the object o f this article to explore the history and philosophy o f the marriage between tradition and Marxism.
T he background o f w hite suprem acy
In South Africa the problem o f working out an acceptable political structure for diverse cultural communities had been delayed by the apartheid system. For better or worse, the growth o f a black culture o f resistance -and with it a philosophy o f liberation -was formatively linked to the search for an inclusive idea o f political identity, one suited to culturally heterogeneous South Africa. But there were some major impediments to this search.
Various forms o f hegemony o f white over black -institutional as well as ideological -bequeathed a socio-econom ic landscape divided betw een a dominant white centre and a subordinate black periphery. This feature o f white centre pitted against black periphery played a m ajor role in legitimizing the fragmentation o f South African society along racial and ethnic lines. The reduction o f the black periphery to a marginalized area o f social life becam e a legitimate process in virtue o f the self-legitimizing authority o f the dominant consensus o f the centre. This is a typical feature o f societies containing marginalized groups -in such societies the centre is usually the source o f legitimation.
It is a truism to say that the social and political identities constructed in the centre w ere ones conforming to white conceptions. W itness how "whiteness" colonized the public sphere in which the common life o f South African society is lived. W hite hegemony o f the centre and white control o f public space enabled the white middle-class to construct a picture o f the universality and objectivity o f its values, and through this claim to universality and to objectivity, to project a false view o f the nature o f a difference (M cLaren, 1994:59-62) . For a difference to be recognized as a significant difference (M cLaren, 1994:55-59) requires that the claim to difference be offered in a specific social and/or historical context which is generally acknowledged or recognized as authoritative with respect to the alleged significance o f the claim. For instance, the claim (often made in the journals o f the Dutch Trekkers) that they, as whites, w ere the carriers o f a superior civilization, has significance as marking a (perceived) difference betw een them and the indigenous peoples o f Southern Africa. The significance o f the claim as a marker o f difference derives from a 19th century milieu in which it w as offered as a justification for aggressive European expansion. Today we recognize the social and historical situatedness o f the claim, and can deal with it as such. To recognize that the significance o f the claim rests on its em bedded ness in social and historical circumstances is to see it as one should -as a claim which has status as a marker o f difference between white and black, but one which can be challenged simply because it has a place in a specific social and historical milieu. As a marker o f difference it has no status outside this milieu.
In South African society the 19th century world-view o f an expansionist Europe continued to prevail. Accordingly "difference" was seen to be a natural given, conforming to the order o f nature (M cLaren, 1994:59-61) . In this context "difference" marked different essences (it is o f the essence o f being white to be superior, and o f the essence o f being black to be inferior), and essences were naturalized (the essential difference between black and white is a natural one, occurring as a m atter o f fact in nature) so it seemed that the social and racial stratification o f South African society conformed to the natural order o f things. As a marker o f difference then, the idea o f "white superiority" w as removed from the social and historical setting in which such ideas standardly gain meaning, and so ceased to be (as it should be) a social and historical construction, becoming merely a tool o f oppression.
• The delegitimization o f black languages
This process o f social and racial stratification based on the interpretation o f "difference" as "naturalized essence" had a counterpart in linguistic stratification. No black language ever becam e an official language. The delegitimization o f black languages as languages o f the public domain had two m ajor consequences: it denied black cultural groups a place in the articulation o f our society's self understanding and it undermined the role o f their languages as purveyors o f culture. It is not difficult to see why these consequences occurred. Language is one carrier o f cultural symbols and meanings o f groups and thus plays a crucial role in constructing social identities. To the extent that black languages were marginalized as languages o f the public domain, to that extent their potential as rallying points o f resistance to social and racial rank ordering w ere diminished. The result w as that black cultural symbols, and the meanings associated with those symbols, failed to become part o f the forms o f social and political life which were articulated and constructed in the centre.
The point at issue here runs much deeper. A language maintains its role as the medium through which conceptions o f social and political organization are articulated in a way which expresses a people's cultural bias, if its speakers are able to sustain their society as an integrated cultural w hole over a long period o f time. If not, a language loses its role as purveyor o f culture. In South A frica the construal o f "difference" as "naturalized essence" formed part o f a racist discourse through which black languages lost this status. In a milieu o f discrimination and oppression it is easy to lose sight o f the proper status o f "difference" as a social and historical construction and to accept a stratification o f racial and linguistic differences as part o f the natural order. It is not difficult to see that this stratification had the effect o f elevating "w hiteness" to a norm-setting position, above the social and historical situatedness which the authority o f such positions standardly have. It is then no accident that the common life o f South African society had been driven by standards o f excellence and achievement which derive from the cultural capital o f the white middle-class.
• The asocial and ahistorical situatedness of the authority of normsetters
The idea o f an acultural, ahistorical position for the authority o f norm setters, and the talk o f "naturalized essences" which becam e part o f their (hegemonic) forms o f discourse, are good examples o f how "truth" functions as a politicized commodity in repressive societies. It is largely through the role language plays in the construction o f meaning and identity that the centre w as able to m anufacture a picture o f its asocial and ahistorical situatedness, and to project an image o f its standards as universal. For the white centre this privileged position had a significant spin-off. It becam e possible, by the same m eans, to construct pictures for others which they w ere persuaded to accept as constitutive o f their self-image. Hence blacks absorbed the idea o f their essential incompetence. N ote how the alleged essentialist nature o f differences between groups becam e the source and justification o f a division o f labour -for whites positions o f responsibility, for blacks the lower ranks o f the job s market. N ote also how the alleged universalism o f the standards o f the centre profited by identifying the achievem ents o f European culture with the achievements o f human civilization. The failure to see that these things are not co-extensive was part o f the failure to criticize forms o f discourse which give little or no recognition to the specific and distinctive values which other cultures have to offer (McLaren, 1994:49) , and which undermine their roles as the context in and through which other people actualize their humanity.
• Public space as locus of action All and all, black groups were reduced to the status o f "add-ons" to the centre (M cLaren, 1994:49) . We have said that a difference can be a marker o f rank. Q ua "difference" then, "add-ons" signify a representation from the centre o f groups accretively joined to a nucleus but which do not form an integral part o f it. This notion o f a "accretive addition" is best explained by considering the picture o f public space it generates: a public space is any locus o f "action-in-concert", the site at which common action is co-ordinated through argument and persuasion. In this space the topic(s) o f conversation -o f w hat gets included in the agenda -is usually something over which competing groups -including the "add-ons" -struggle. Participation in this struggle is a push for justice (a push for a public debate on some issue o f unfairness).
Note, for instance, how various feminist movements had gone public over the question o f w om en's rights, and forced a redrawing o f the boundary between "private" sphere and "public" sphere, pushing the question over the status o f women from the former to the latter in order that it may becom e debatable as a question within the realm o f justice. Similarly, pressures from the periphery over the question o f civil and political rights for black people has been an attempt to go public and let justice be done by challenging the centre's monopoly o f power. The kind o f pressure which had been exerted clearly showed the limits o f the white model o f public space: it could maintain itself only by a highly question able delimitation between social spheres, some o f which w ere recognized as legitimate ones o f public debate, others not. So, for instance, " labour" never figured as an item on the public agenda because this sphere o f social life had become a centre o f black resistance to white power. It becam e part o f the public conversation only once the basis o f its exclusion -the philosophy underlying the division o f labour -had been challenged and overthrown. It is to this strugglein essence a struggle over the question o f black political identity -that w e now turn.
T he quest for political self-definition
The black resistance movements understood their task in a certain way: They took themselves to be opposing a racist ideology, one which claimed that whites are -as a matter o f fact, a given o f nature -superior to blacks .
In very general terms ideology is usually described as a " 'science' o f ideas" which raises questions about the basis and validity o f our most fundamental ideas -ideas like the proper ordering o f social life, the nature o f justice, the moral requirements o f interpersonal relations, and so on. Ideological discourse is often contrasted with scientific discourse which, according to the preferred conception o f the latter, is not value-laden (as ideological discourse is claimed to be), not dependent on any world-view or perspective (as ideological discourse is claimed to be), and aims at truth (which ideological discourse cannot do since it has no claims to objectivity or universality in all the senses o f these terms). This latter point is particularly interesting since it encapsulates much o f M arx's ideas on ideology (as formulated by Thompson, 1990:41) . A ccording to M arx ... ideology is a system o f representations w hich serves to sustain existing relations o f class dom ination by orientating individuals tow ards the past rather than the future, or tow ards im ages and ideals w hich conceal class relations and d etract from the collective pu rsu it o f social change.
In other words, ideology masks truth by propagating untruths. As Thompson (1990:35) makes the point that " ideology ... is a theoretical doctrine and activity which erroneously regards ideas as autonomous and efficacious and which fails to grasp the real conditions and characteristics o f social-historical life" .
There are at least two critical themes which w e must take note o f implicit in Thompson's formulation o f M arx's approach to ideology. W e have already touched on them. They are:
• The erroneous asocial, ahistorical treatment o f the notion o f a difference through which whites aspired to dominate blacks, and the false asocial, ahistorical position o f the authority o f the white normsetters through which the values o f W estern culture aspired to universal status.
• The inequitable and unfair division o f labour which has thrived on the false propositions mentioned in the previous sentence.
Thompson's formulation o f M arx's approach to ideology is a pointer to the falsity o f racism, especially in its institutionalized forms. According to M arx all systems o f thought and ideas are always em bedded in and determined by social and historical conditions, especially in the material conditions o f social life (McLellan, 1986:17) . On his assumption o f the social determination o f human consciousness there can be no system o f thought or ideas which have claim to truth outside a social and historical context. This pushes white claims to a natural superiority back into a social and historical context where it can be exposed as the orthodoxy o f a group intent on maintaining its power. The division o f labour between "mental" and "manual" thrived on a false sociology, one unconditioned by the material conditions o f social life and a history o f production. This false sociology produced a class division between black and white, the former becoming a labour class, the latter an entrepreneurial class with control over the means o f production.
Marxism offers a particular view o f the nature o f society. According to Marx society is constructed by the way in which human beings respond to their material needs (needs for food, shelter, work, leisure time, and so on). Since these needs are satisfied through their labour (Kessler, 1987:41) , M arx recognized labour as the fundamental human activity, and held that the only valid social science will be one which accepted labour as the starting point o f theorizing about society. So all social practices had to be explained with reference to labour, and this included the division o f labour which prevailed in any society since the division o f labour determined all social and economic arrangements. M arx believed that this starting point in labour secured for M arxism the only possible "correct view" o f society, and as such it generated a useful critique o f society: in any society in which an uneven distribution o f pow er and resources prevailed, an ideology could be found, masking perceptions o f a "true account" o f its proper social and economic organization (M cLellan, 1986:14-16 ). Thus, in South Africa, a racist ideology created the illusion that the division o f labour between "m ental" and "manual", and the concomitant unequal distribution o f pow er and resources were glimpses o f a true reality in which whites were the "natural" leaders. W hat makes these racist ideas ideology (and hence false) was their distortion o f the fact that at bottom the conflict in South Africa was a class conflict.
W e have said that a racist ideology falsely portrayed South African society as cohesive rather than conflictual (as it in fact is), and falsely attem pted to justify an unequal distribution o f pow er and resources with reference to a "natural order o f things" . If we look beyond ideology w e will see that South African society is indeed conflictual in nature, and that this conflict is due to two factors:
• The division o f labour, between "mental" and "manual" which empowered only whites, placing them in positions o f economic and political power.
• The creation o f an open market economy, and a community in which individuals com pete for motives o f self-interest, with the concomitant loss o f traditional communal social organizations in which the interest o f the individual coincided with that o f the community.
The first above-mentioned idea is an unwanted consequence o f the second. The exploitation inherent in the relations between the white capitalist class and the black labour class w as conceded by the illusion o f a free society based on the free exchange o f commodities. The kind o f community which developed w as the very antithesis o f w hat (in M arx's view) community is all about. W e return later to this point. Here w e merely note, in summary form, the negative picture M arx presents o f a class-divided society like South Africa.
In South Africa the best-off class (the whites) w as also the ruling class i.e. its interests were served by the major political institutions, which included using all instruments o f coercion in favour o f the best-off class, at the expense o f the labouring class (the blacks).
It follows that the social arrangements acceptable to the best-off class would never be acceptable to the labouring class, and hence that a state o f conflict prevailed.
It also follows that inegalitarian distributions were likely to remain in force for as long as the best-off class strived to maintain its privileged position -unless, o f course, it could be overthrown by force or any other means.
What makes ideas ideological was that they m asked the true nature o f society, creating the illusion that an unequal distribution o f social and economic resources was symptomatic o f the proper ordering o f relations between the classes. In other words, free exchange in a capitalist economy was simply a cover for a distribution in which one class (the whites) exploited another class (the blacks). Marx was intent on showing that a certain kind o f social determination o f thought led to ideological thinking.
Marx, however, operated on the assumption that all thought is socially determined: There can be no system o f thought and ideas which have a claim to truth outside the social/historical context in which thought and ideas arise. So, if this was true, M arx's so-called "correct view " o f society -the whole picture o f understanding social arrangements in terms o f labour, production and distribution -must be ideological too (M cLellan, 1986:19-20) . M arx did not draw a clear distinction between the idea o f socially determined thought and ideology in so far as he did not clearly show w hat kind o f social determination produces ideology. Marx can clearly not accept the view that all socially determined thought must be ideological, for this view turns his "correct view" o f society into ideological thoughts as well. Yet M arx continued to call all systems o f thought which perpetuate relations o f domination (o f ruling class over labouring class) ideological -a system o f thought which he contrasted with his "correct view", and which he thought was the only correct (socialist) view.
A Marxist attempt at political self-definition
Black resistance to white oppression developed into a quest for political self definition. The initial attempt at political self-definition w as modelled on a Marxist conception o f the just political order. Consider the following view:
E xam ining B lack C onsciousness as an ideology capable o f challenging the cultural hegem ony o f the w hite suprem acist regim e entails understanding the m ovem ent as the ethico-political w eapon o f an op p ressed class struggling to reaffirm its hum anity. ... It w ould be w rong to equate the B lack C onsciousness m ovem ent w ith a m ere cultural renaissance; it w as indeed m ore than that. B lack C onsciousness recognized the cen trality o f the m aterial conditions o f existence and it w as precisely because o f these that it rejected collaboration w ith w hites ... (F alton, 1986:57-58) .
The agenda for the creation o f a M arxist political state began with the identification o f the black existential condition as that o f
• a labouring class, and hence • a socially exploited group, intent on • ending its exploitation by rising to political self-definition and power.
The Black Conscious Movement (henceforward the M ovement) recognized that since colour determined the privileged position o f w hites, there could be no alliance between black and white workers. W hite w orkers could not be regarded as genuine w orkers -as members o f an oppressed and exploited class -as long as they enjoyed white privileges (job reservation, higher w ages, recognition o f trade unions etc.) (Falton, 1986:84) . Consequently, a genuine w orking classwhich is formed when persons who perform the same function in the production process unite to defend their common interests -did not develop for whites to the extent that it developed for blacks. Indeed, the M ovement determined that all participants in white privilege were accom plices in oppression on the grounds that to participate w as to fail to prevent crimes being committed against humanity. This meant that whites who w ere opposed to the apartheid system could not be included in the M ovement since they w ere participants in the system.
These " liberal" w hites had to be w atched lest they arrest and blunt the edge o f black revolutionary zeal, for their " 'm osaic' multi-racialism" 1 w as simply a cover for the maintenance o f white pow er and privilege. The goal o f racial integration propounded by these w hites w as a futile political gesture as long as w hite norms in culture, economics and morality remained ascendant. The critical point is that w hite norms represent the individualism o f the privileged class which was opposed to the communal outlook characteristic o f African society. Falton (1986:86) expresses the point as follows: " It [the M ovement] condemned the conditions o f everyday life, the capitalistic-induced erosion o f communual solidarity, and African corporate personality." 1 T his expression is adopted from Ranevcdzi N engwekhulu -quoted in Falton (1986:84) .
The M ovement had to exploit the solidarity o f African culture, and African cultural groups had to coalesce into a solid pow er block to bring down the white power structure. This meant, in effect, reviving the "consensual foundations" (Falton's expression -1986:86) o f African culture.
Towards self-definition: The social thesis
All persons have (legitimate) interests which they seek to prom ote through the channels which institutional structures create. The social preconditions for the effective fulfilment o f a person's interests are linked to a cultural context which gives form to these conditions. One crucial condition is the creation o f a context o f choice in and through which people actualize themselves. The social thesis which shall briefly be discussed is an essential ingredient o f traditional communal (communitarian) social organization onto which a M arxist picture o f self understanding w as grafted (Hountondji, 1983:142-147) . In this respect some features o f the traditional picture which played a role in the development o f a hybrid Marxism will be indicated.
The particularity o f one kind o f a communitarian model is perhaps best exemplified by examining some o f the essential social conditions which unite a community's social and moral identity2 (W iredu, 1992:80-93 ). It is a major assumption o f the approach adopted in this article that the capacity for moral choice and development can only be exercised in a cultural setting which makes provision for its growth. Let us call this the social thesis. The social thesis describes the •se/Z'-understanding o f one kind o f community and, as formulated below, shows one version o f the social meaning o f communitarian perspectival models. According to the social thesis an individual's choice o f w ay o f life is a choice constrained by the community's pursuit o f shared ends. This pursuit o f the common good is the primary goal o f the political community and always takes precedence over the pursuit o f individually chosen ends. Communual ends cannot -all other things being equal -be overridden or vetoed because shared ends have much greater weight (value) in the life o f the community than other ends. The common good is conceived o f as being good because it fits the patterns o f preferences o f individual members; this common good is not single-faceted, but implies many aspects, each fitting a sphere o f social life and resting on a consensus (agreement) about its value. The common good, then, define substantive conceptions about the good life -identified for application in specific social contexts. The good life for an individual is conceived o f as coinciding with the good o f the community, and a person's choice is highly or lowly ranked according to the w ay in which it contributes to or detracts from the common good.
The social thesis describes linguistic communities (Bell, 1995:157-165) . A linguistic community has a history and various traditions (o f morality and reasoning) which inform the narratives o f individuals' lives and link them to those o f their ancestors. Languages embody distinctive w ays o f experiencing the world and thus play a crucial role in defining the experiences o f a community as their particular experiences. Since language is a determinant o f a particular outlook it is one significant factor that shape a w ay o f life. Speakers communicate with each other about their common history and have access to the significance o f events in it in a way not communicable to non-speakers, or in other languages. This means that language never is just a neutral medium for communication or for identifying the contents o f actions -rather language itself is content, a value laden reference for communual loyalties and animosities.
The social thesis also describes a community o f mutuality (W iredu, 1992:80-93) , one in which each member stands in a dialogical relation to other members, i.e. a relation which requires the recognition o f reciprocal obligations. In a community o f mutuality members recognize that since the (personal) projects they pursue, and through which they give meaning to their lives, projects are made available by a cultural structure. Thus they have -all other things being equal -a duty to sustain these structures. In so far as the recognition o f the need to preserve a cultural context is the prerequisite o f a meaningful life, it derives from the social meaning o f a socially em bedded notion o f obligation.
A ccording to the social thesis the community (and not individual members) is the locus o f deontology3 (W iredu, 1992:80-93) . The argument about morality and reason takes place within traditions. A major assumption o f this attem pt to contextualize the argument is that beliefs about morality and reason cannot be successfully justified in detachment from actual w ays o f life and the social meanings em bodied in them. This point encapsulates the status o f the community as the locus o f deontology. The community is the focus o f moral identification and hence those collective decisions always have overriding moral authority. The collective decision cannot be trumped by individual decisions because identification with the common good as the focus o f allegiance must remain paramount. The tension generated by the ensuing struggle betw een tradition and modernity is a familiar one: the longer a particular interpretation o f a social practice goes back in time, the greater its historical significance. Traditions em body many years o f communual effort and thought, and it is unlikely that a It is p recisely because racism w as such an active ideological force encroaching on the m aterial base o f society, that the South A frican political econom y develo p ed as a V olkskapitalism e. ... V olkskapitalism e is a social system in w hich a racially determ ined hegem onic core, con tro llin g the state, drains the econom ic su rp lu s from a racially determ ined sub o rd in ate periphery.
If Falton is right, racism w as the main mover in the consciousness o f black intellectuals towards the identification o f white political and econom ic arrange ments with an oppressive capitalist system. For them M arx's labour theory provided a theory o f politics. Now, being a phenom enon articulated in specific contexts, politics is the ways and means by which social conflict and notably class conflict is manifested and managed. M arx clearly gives great weight to economic arrangements in his critique o f society. "The m ode o f production o f material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness o f men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness" (quoted in Miliband, 1990:7) .
But this weight is due to M arx's belief that human em ancipation can never be achieved in the political realm alone, but requires revolutionary transformation o f the economic and social order o f capitalist society. O f course, in the M arxist scheme o f things, politics w as taken to be an expression o f alienation, and emancipation w as taken to mean the end o f this alienation -in effect, the end o f politics. Politics, then, w as seen to have a determinate function: it is a necessary stage in the development towards the post-capitalist state, and as such it is an activity w hose end is its own annulment.
Labour, conflict and alienation
The idea o f conflict lies at the core o f M arxist politics. In the M arxist scheme o f things conflict is caused by a state o f domination (by the capitalist classes) and subjection (o f the labouring classes), which is to be ended by a transformation o f the conditions giving rise to it. For M arx conflict is inherent in the class system: domination and subjection are features o f class societies, and are based on specific features o f their modes o f production (McLellan, 1986:17-18) . The essential feature is the distribution o f the material and moral goods o f a societya process, put and kept in motion by the dominant classes, to appropriate the greater share o f a society's wealth, in order to maintain, strengthen and extend their dominant position.
Conflict is generated by the exploitation o f labour and the distribution o f the products o f labour. M arx identified two areas in which those who controlled a society's modes o f production maintained relations o f domination and subjection:
• Regarding "relations o f production" (quoted and discussed in Kymlicka 1989:100-131) M arx believed that the mode o f production dehum anized the w orker in her position in some production process, reducing her a cog in a machine with no control over the system which needed her labour.
• Regarding "relations o f exchange" (quoted and discussed in Kymlicka 1989:100-131) (i.e. distribution), M arx believed that the open market served only the interests o f the governing classes, i.e. it w as the arena in which the labour o f the w orker advanced the material and moral needs o f others.
In societies in which the modes o f production served the ends o f domination, the w orker w as denied her true nature as social being in three w ays:4
• Relations o f production separate w orkers from the individuating functions o f their social roles, making it easy for them to be exploited as a labouring class.
Relations o f production become exploitive not only in the sense that w orkers are unable to discover the good in their roles, but also in the sense that they becom e the means to the enrichment o f someone else in the ruling class. 4 F o r these insights I am indebted to Kymlicka (1989) .
• Relations o f production alienate (separate) the w orker from the products o f her labour, from herself in so far as the individuating function o f a social role is denied her, and from society, in so far as she has no voice in the articulation o f her community's self-understanding.
• Relations o f production divide the w orkers' life into a "private" and a "public" sphere, the latter becoming the domain o f the ruling classes, and public institutions' instruments o f class rule. The point to note here is very significant: the public sphere o f social life is supposed to be the arena where all individuals pursue the common good as their individual good. It is in this arena where social forces meet and engage in dialogue in order to determine the community's political agenda. Social forces, then, are always (potentially) political forces. Social forces gain political clout when they gain a foothold in the public forum, because then the issues they wish to discuss becom e issues about justice. All this means that, if M arx is right, the ruling classes have silenced the political will o f the labouring classes by their control over the public sphere.
C lass consciousness an d th e classless utopia
By regarding the worker as a class against capital, M arx assigned a political criterion to the notion o f a w orking class (M iliband, 1990:22) . For M arx no class is truly a class unless it acquires the capacity to organize itself politically. Being politically organized brings with it the notion o f a "class consciousness" (Miliband, 1990:31-41 ) -the consciousness which the members o f a class have o f its "true" interests. W hat are the w orkers' "true" interests?
If Marx is right our "true" interests are satisfied through labour; labour is the fundamental human activity, and the only valid starting point o f theorizing about society. All social practices have to be explained with reference to labour, including the division o f labour between "mental" and "manual" . M arx believed that his starting point in labour would secure for M arxism the only possible "correct view" o f society, and as such it would generate a useful critique: in any society in which an uneven distribution o f pow er and resources occurs, and ideology could be found masking perceptions o f a "true account" .
What makes ideas ideological for M arx, then, w as that they m asked the true nature o f society, creating the illusion that an unequal distribution o f social and economic resources was symptomatic o f the proper ordering o f the relation between the classes. The "true account" -an account focusing on labour and class-conflict as constituting the proper ordering o f relations -must show that free exchange in a capitalist economy w as simply a cover for a w ay o f distribution in which the ruling classes exploit the labouring classes. In other w ords, the "true account" must strip the ruling class o f its ideology, and expose it for w hat it is.
Thus it w as necessary to show that the ruling classes engage in deliberate deception, whereby their spokesmen (or "ideologues") attem pt to persuade the subordinate classes o f the universal validity o f principles (o f social and economic organization) which they know to be partial and class-bound, but which they propagate for its utility in the maintenance o f the given social order. But this is ju st one side o f a fake coin. The other side portrays the working classes as a constituent o f a universal social order in which their labour has a subordinate place. But labour, for Marx, is the primary constituent o f human culture. This being so, a radical rupture with tradition -especially traditional property relations -is called for (M iliband, 1990:36) . Only the labouring classes are capable o f acting on behalf o f society, to remove from it the greatest impediment to the realization o f true human nature, viz, the capitalist mode o f production. In sw eeping aw ay the traditional modes o f production, the working classes will also have sw ept aw ay the conditions for the existence o f class conflict, as well as the very notion o f a class itself. This end-point o f the class-less society M arx identified with the arrival o f the communist utopia. M arx's idea o f the " class-consciousness" o f the labouring classes, then, may be taken to mean the understanding that the emancipation o f the working classes, and o f society, require the overthrow o f the capitalist system, and the will to overthrow it. With respect to the latter, M arx talked o f a revolutionary consciousness which involved a very definite political agenda. W hat w as this agenda, and how w as it argued for? As indicated above, the capitalist system failed to treat people as equals in two areas o f social life, in "relations o f production" and "relations o f exchange" . In these contexts the ruling classes did not see themselves as responding to the legitimate labour-related needs o f others; indeed, in society they created social interactions which subverted the recognition o f these needs.
W hat would constitute a recognition o f these needs? M arx thought that the political agenda o f the labouring classes must give prominence to an equality principle (discussed in Kymlicka, 1989:100-131) , which w as expressed as follows:
• Labourers have an equal right to the products o f their labour This principle has, however, to be qualified. W e may m ake this point in terms o f the familiar distinction between an equality o f regard and an equality o f outcome. With regard to the former, Marx maintained that all labourers are equally creators o f culture through their labour, and that this entitled them to an equality o f consideration (respect, dignity). In practice this meant that all labourers are entitled to equal consideration regarding the satisfaction o f their needs and desires. It did not mean that everyone's needs and desires should be equally fulfilled, as an equality o f outcome requires. M arx favoured the idea o f an equality o f regard since it makes provision for unequal talents and unequal needs, which demand an unequal distribution o f the products o f labour. So the equality principle had to be amplified by the addition o f the following:
• To have an equal right to the products o f one's labour is to have an equal right to unequal labour The modified principle meant that if you have greater talents, then a greater labour output is required o f you, and if you have greater needs then you are entitled to a greater share o f the total labour output, irrespective o f whether you produced the products o f labour or someone else. For M arx unequal talents and unequal needs are relevant moral differences between persons, which must be acknowledged in the distributive patterns o f social institutions. So, in M arx's good society, the following principle o f distribution is the right one:
• From each according to his talents, to each according to his needs Some observation o f the latter point is called for. First it assum es a particular view o f the nature o f free choice. Briefly, the w hole point o f sustaining a society run on a labour agenda is to abolish classes and class conflict. This agenda protects the avenues through which the labouring classes arrive at political self understanding, and as such creates a context o f choice for them. But acceptance o f the proposed political forms will lead to limitations on choice o f forms o f the good life. This is unavoidable, though the reason should be obvious: the moral and material goods available to w orkers are all goods internal to a cultural structure (Buchanan, 1982:32) , which is to say that these goods are available to them through their perform ance o f structured roles in the labour market.
But we should take care not to misread the limitations in this view o f what constitutes choice. M arx offers a picture o f the emergence o f the social individual as the foundation o f the good society. The social individual is intended to replace the competitive individual which capitalism creates in two areas o f social interaction: "relations o f production" and "relations o f exchange" . In these two areas o f social interaction conflicts arise from the very nature o f the unchosen relations between individuals. Now, as I understand M arx, the creation o f the social individual will eliminate conflict since the social individual labours for the community (i.e. asserts no unjustified rights-claims to the common wealth). Note M arx's claim in this regard:
"relations o f production" and "relations o f exchange" are social processes in which affective ties betw een individuals will eliminate unchosen conflicts (Buchanan, 1982:31-35) . In the com munist state a social identity (as "labourers o f the common good") is a precondition o f informed choice. Social interaction in the labour field would be governed by such choice, and would accordingly be harmonious (and not conflictual), because no one would choose ends which are in conflict with the common interest.
Has Marx got hold o f the tmth here? One defence o f M arx's notion o f choice runs as follows (discussed in Kymlicka, 1989 :100-131):
-If w e try to stand outside the roles o f society to arrive at a perspective from which to judge the value o f a choice (o f way o f life), w e run into emptiness. The instruction freely to choose a way o f life gives no direction for choice, for such " freedom" offers no determinable criterion o f w hat w ay o f life is good. We will not know that our choices are worth pursuing. This is because our ideas o f w hat it means to lead a valuable life is a consequence o f our doing things directed at specific ends within a social context which provides criteria o f worth and value. Free choice understood as something which has inherent worth or value is something w e arrive at as a consequence o f action directed at or dedicated to other socially determined ends. In a M arxist society, geared as it is towards self-realization, no one is concerned with self-realization as an end which can be isolated and pursued for itself; they are rather (if M arx is to be believed) concerned with their work -achieving or realizing the goods internal to their roles in labour -as the means to freedom and self-realization. Freedom and self-realization come about as a consequence o f the achievement or realization o f their roles and purposes in the social fabric -specifically in the context o f labour.
A nother line o f defence runs as follows: M arx's social individual cannot be a person w hose freely chosen projects deny her social nature. This is because, in a communist state, choice is informed by social identity. In the communist state the w orker sees her labour as satisfying her most important needs, and hence as her most important project. This makes for a co-operative way of life. If Marx is right, co-operation would outstrip competition because no one has any advantage over anyone else with regard to control over the instruments o f social and political power. Indeed, control would strictly be unnecessary because in the communist state the administration o f justice would not only be superfluous (there would be no need for competition over limited resources), but also undesirable (competition for resources -limited or otherw ise -would be dysfunctional).
-Secondly, the labour theory o f politics em phasizes "relations o f production" and "relations o f exchange" as the foundation o f social interaction, and not notions o f distributive justice (discussed in Buchanan, 1982:50-69) . According to Marx, as long as problems o f distributive justice sit at the centre o f our thinking, communities will be divided, and sectarian interests prevail. In such divided communities appeals to (redistributive) justice are attem pts to remedy defects in the community. Such appeals are needed because the community is defective, being merely an arena in which persons act from m otives o f self-interest in competition with others, rather than the arena in which members accept responsibility for fellow members in co-operative pursuit o f the common interest. The good communist community will have no need for appeals to (redistributive) justice and indeed, no need for justice, because members will make no (conflicting) claims to resources they regard as solely theirs. The point is, if the community as a whole had an identity o f interests, and members are bound by affective ties, justice is superfluous because no one needs to regard herself as a bearer o f rights who can at any time become involved in interpersonal conflicts over claims to resourcesconflicts in which it is necessary to assert rights.5
A communist community will be one in which the communal interest remains paramount, and this requires the abolition o f the division o f labour between "mental" and "manual" which has characterized capitalist system s o f production. The abolition o f this division o f labour will mean the abolition o f private property, and with it one important cause o f conflictual relations between persons. The real evil that attaches to conflictual relations is that they are unchosen: w orkers find themselves in competitive relations with other workers, which require that they regard others as the means to the satisfaction o f their interests and this breaks down a sense o f community in that an individual's development and growth can be bought only at the expense o f others. Such conflictual relations must be replaced by a sense o f sociality based on productive work for the sake o f the community. This sense o f sociality would replace the need for justice because individuals would cease to have (unchosen) conflicting ends.
-Thirdly, the labour theory o f politics seeks to create a revolutionary platform (Miliband, 1990:43-52) . According to Marx,
[t]he ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class, which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it (quoted in Miliband, 1990:49) .
M arx's main target is, o f course, the labour process itself, in particular, the division o f labour between "mental" and "manual" . Capitalist " relations o f production" are, M arx argued, hierarchical, authoritarian, instilling in the w orker a sense o f subordination as part o f the w orking-class culture. The cultural fall-out o f top-down authoritarian structures are, in the capitalist framework, strongly pervaded by commercialism and money values. The institutions through which the ideological hegemony o f the ruling classes w as maintained, w as controverted by Althusser (a follower o f Marx) as "ideological state apparatuses" (Miliband, 1990:54 ) (e.g. the system o f different public and private schools, the system o f different political parties, state controlled media), the object being to show that the dominant capitalist class, under protection o f the state, employs vast state resources to bring its own weight to bear on civil society. This blurs an important distinction between state and class power. Class pow er is pow er which a dominant class exercises to maintain its predominance in civil society, and as such may be legitimately challenged by any other (class-based) counter power. State pow er is something different. State pow er is neutral pow er (not the prerogative o f any class or pressure group), and is exercised through state institutions (e.g. police), and only in areas where a general consensus o f opinion in the community permits its use. Things go wrong as soon as class pow er is exercised through the agency o f the state, because the privileged class then com mands vast state resources to oppress its opponents. When this happens the state itself enters into the "consciousness" creating industry (M iliband, 1990:49 55) , thereby obliterating ideological apparatuses which have an emancipatory function in civil society, turning them into state apparatuses where they lose this function.
The last points made here are important pointers to the M arxist theory o f political culture. The M arxist analysis o f conflict in the state as class-conflict, centred in the concept o f labour, implies that M arx did not see the capitalist state as the trustee o f society as a whole (Miliband, 1990:66-74) . Rather, the working classes are society's trustees. The idea that the capitalist state can be society's trustee is, in the M arxist scheme, simply an ideological veil which the ruling, capitalist class draw s over the reality o f its class-rule, so as to legitimate that rule. So the institutions o f state -the law courts, the police force, the defence force, systems o f education etc. -are never neutral, nor can they ever be neutral arbiters o f competing class interests. The state and its institutions are partisan. The ruling class not only owns and controls the predominant part o f the means o f material production, it also owns and controls the means o f "mental" or "psychological" production. This is not a propagandist^ point: the claim, rather, is that once class pow er is translated into state pow er, the state loses its central function o f neutral administration. M arx's labour theory o f culture proposes that any unification o f class and state pow er can only serve the interests o f the ruling class, because the state becomes an instrument o f the ruling class, i.e. it acts at the behest o f the ruling class. The state, in fact, becom es a class state: it acts for the purpose o f maintaining the existing system o f domination through a system o f centralization and the creation o f monopolies. The creation o f a class state is, in M arx's opinion, the outcome o f an ideological-cultural persuasion which his own theory w as meant to counter.
Communitarianism and Marxism
I have attempted to show what lure Marxism had for black intellectuals. In the political consciousness o f black intellectuals the remedy w as seen to be the creation o f a certain kind o f community, one in which the goods internal to communal relations (especially economic relations) are also personal goods. The working classes could be freed, and equality restored, by freeing people from alienation, which meant restoring the identity-defining function o f their social roles and gaining a voice for them in the articulation o f the community's self understanding -in effect organizing the labour classes into a political force.
The lure o f M arx's picture o f the good society can be explained with reference to the idea that in M arx the communal interest remains paramount, and this requires the abolition o f the division o f labour (between "mental" and "manual") which has characterized capitalist systems o f production. I wish to argue that the labouring process, as explanatory model o f social evolution, com bines a traditional communitarian picture with an overlay o f M arxism precisely because a racist ideology created racially divided classes. The racial character o f relations between labour and capital were, in effect, the organizing principle o f South African communities. Political pow er, the pow er o f the state, played a primary role in the process o f integration, providing the necessary social preconditions for the existence o f a capitalist economy. The political system was thus justified with reference to its consistency with policing the requirem ents affecting relations o f production and exchange between labour and capital.
The link between communitarianism and Marxism is a consequence o f historical factors rather than a conceptual link. Paulin Hountondji (1983:146) , commenting on the philosophy in Nkrum ah's Consciencism , observes that the book w as a response to a classic objection:
... that in adopting socialism , A frica w ould be deliv erin g h e rse lf to an im ported ideology and b e traying her original civilization. It w as precisely this issue, inspired by the m ost traditionalist cultural nationalism , that N krum ah tried to address in C onsciencism . T he o bject o f the book w a s to link socialism w ith the purest A frican tradition by show ing that socialism , far from being a betrayal o f this tradition w ould a ctually be its best possible translation into m odem idiom .
In the 1964 edition o f Consciencism Nkrumah states the link as follows (quoted in Hountondji, 1983:144) : "But because o f the continuity o f communalism with socialism in communalistic societies, socialism is not a revolutionary creed, but a restatement in contemporary idiom o f the principles underlying communalism ."
However, in the 1970 edition Nekrumah is no longer so strident.
But because the spirit of communalism still exists to some extent in societies with a communalist past, socialism and communism are not, in a strict sense of the word, 'revolutionary' creeds. They may be described as restatements in contemporary idiom of the principles underlying communalism (quoted in Hountondji, 1983:144) .
According to Hountondji, the 1970 edition accepts two premises denied in the 1964 edition. They are N krum ah's acceptance o f the erroneous 1964 view that, prior to colonialism, class-divisions were unknown in Africa, and the acceptance o f "the universality o f class struggle" (Hountondji, 1983:146) as the basis o f all political revolution. Indeed, Nkrumah closely identifies colonialism with capitalism -"a colonialist structure is essentially ancillary to capitalism" (Hountondji, 1983:144) -ju st as black intellectuals in South Africa identified racism with capitalism.
Hountondji identifies two problems in the w ay o f realistic attem pts at defending political identities in Africa. First, the attempt to oppose traditional African cultures to the colonizers' cultures tends to "flatten" the traditional cultures, i.e. it denies them their "internal pluralism", which, secondly, gives rise to a "back w ard-looking" cultural nationalism, and which, most importantly, says Hountondji (1983:162) " divert the attention o f the exploited classes from the real political and economical conflicts which divide them from the ruling classes under the fallacious pretext o f their common participation in 'th e' national culture" .
Hountondji clearly has great sympathy with N krum ah's 1970 insights. He clearly sees M arxism as the African alternative to capitalist colonialism:
We must promote positively a Marxist theoretical tradition in our countries -a contradictory scientific debate around the work o f Marx and his followers. For let us nor forget this: Marxism itself is a tradition, a plural debate based on the theoretical foundation laid by Marx (Hountondji, 1983:183 -emphasis added) .
H ountondji's remark concerning participation in "the" national culture is meant to bring home the idea that colonialism has "arrested" African cultures by "reducing their internal pluralism" (Hountondji, 1983:166) , a view he shares with Nkrumah: "Capitalism at home is domestic colonialism" (from the 1970 edition o f C onsciencism , quoted in Hountondji, 1983:144).
So there is in essence a conceptual discontinuity betw een A frica's " internal pluralism" and its Marxism. Is this true? Hountondji's unstated premise is clear: the idea o f the national culture is a colonial import, aided and abetted by capitalist economic structures -an idea which is in conflict with domestic pluralism (conceived as community-centred social organizations). But just how does Marxism fit the domestic picture?
I have argued that the connection between traditional forms o f social organizations (communitarianism) and Marxism is historical rather than conceptual -and my argument has been that in South African society racial stratification has been the most significant historical factor accounting for the appeal o f Marxism. It is true that communitarians and M arxists adopted much the same view o f justice. Justice is in essence a remedial virtue, a remedy for some defect in community. But regarding the nature o f the defect there is much dispute. Communitarians standardly appeal to the remedial virtue o f justice as a way o f settling (potential) conflicts between different conceptions o f the good. Since any account o f justice is a cultural account, based on a supposed identity o f interests among members o f a (political) community, conflict is viewed as dysfunctional, i.e. as destructive o f the common good. M arxists, on the other hand, view the defect in the community similarly as a conflict o f interests, but accounts for it in terms o f the division o f labour which sets w orker against w orker in unchosen conflict (competition) by which each can develop only at the expense o f the other.
But, these differences o f emphasis in what each takes to be the defect in community notwithstanding, it seems to me that Marxism found favour because, given the circumstances in oppressive colonialism (including its racist forms in South Africa), it served as a tool o f social critique.
M arx's concept o f the labouring process provided a critique o f South African society. Now, I believe that H aberm as (quoted in Sensat, 1979:41-54 ) is wrong in arguing that M arxist theory cannot serve as critical theory because it overlooks the important point that production and socialization are tw o distinct dimensions o f social evolution. Production refers to the appropriation o f natural resources by society for the satisfaction o f human needs (a process H aberm as calls "purposiverational action" (quoted in Sensat, 1979:42) . Socialization is the process by which people adapt to society through communicative action. This is the process leading to a division o f society into tw o domains -the "public" (which deals with issues o f justice) and the "private" (which deals with issues about the good life, and in which individuals are autonomous). Production is governed by technical rules, and socialization (communicative action) by social norms validated by consensus achieved through normed discourse. Both socialization and production are subject to the validity claims o f social discourse.
Rationalization according to Haberm as means theoretical-technical insight into the realm o f "production", and practical insight into the realm o f " socialization" . Indeed, two distinct social domains are at issue here: corresponding to the "public" and "private", the former is manifested in the development o f productive (technological) forces, the latter in extending communication free o f domination. The role o f critical theory is primarily (though not exclusively) to focus on the sphere o f socialization and specifically, to develop critiques o f ideology in the interests o f emancipation, since such critiques help to dissolve the barriers to the discursive solution to moral and political problems. According to Habermas, M arx did not see that developments in these respective realms are logically independent o f each other, and so failed to recognize socialization as a dimension o f social evolution distinct from production. Marx attem pted to reduce the com municative dimension to labour, i.e. to production, and this was because " ... M arx unwittingly rules out reflection as a motive force in history by categorizing the self-generative process o f the human species as a labor process" (Habermas quoted in Sensat, 1997:69) .
The upshot is that M arx's interpretation o f history (as the self-generation o f the human species through labour) led him to believe that the transition to socialism could be ascertained scientifically as inevitable, independently o f w hat the labourer seeking emancipation, happens to think. Haberm as thinks that this conception o f history is wrong -justification from history is to be sought from the "structures o f linguistically produced intersubjectivity" (Sensat, 1979:161) . Marx accurately predicted that the state would tamper with economics, but his conception o f history could not foresee that such tampering could not be justified with reference to market fairness. State intervention w as, in fact, the signal for the economic door to be opened and for organized labour to demand that the state satisfy their legitimate needs -a function which was standardly left to the market.
Haberm as may be wrong because the racist ideology against which Black Consciousness struggled in effect obliterated the distinction between production and socialization. Though M arx equated historical progress with development of the forces o f production, his concept o f the labouring process is pivotal, and in South Africa served as the springboard o f emancipation. In South Africa the economic door w as opened to political decision-making, not by virtue o f the failure o f the ideology o f fair market exchange, but rather the failure o f a racist ideology. The fact that this increased state pow er meant that capitalist society in South Africa w as forced into a crisis o f legitimation pertaining primarily to the validation o f norms o f political participation for black people. 
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